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Abstract. We propose an extension of DRT for analyzing pictorial narratives. We test drive
our PicDRT framework by analyzing the way authors represent characters’ mental states and
perception in comics. Our investigation goes beyond Abusch and Rooth (2017) in handling
not just free perception sequences, but also a form of apparent perspective blending somewhat
reminiscent of free indirect discourse.
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1. Introduction
Semantics is the study of meaning, where meaning is typically equated with truth conditions, in
turn equated with sets of possible worlds. Semanticists study the truth-conditional contributions
of various linguistic constructions (belief ascriptions, the German particle ja, etc.). But there
are many non-linguistic human artifacts and activities that can be fruitfully analyzed as having
truth-conditions and propositional content. Maps, gestures, traffic signs, paintings, mime per-
formances, emoji, comics, ballet, music etc. Some of these can be highly effective means of
communicating information, or of telling a vivid story. Some, like traffic signs, achieve their
communicative function in a rather language-like way, with a more or less conventionalized,
symbolic lexicon and some rules of composition. On the other side of the spectrum we have
photography and mime, which convey information iconically, i.e. they depict what they are
about by virtue of resemblance rather than mere convention.2
Recent advances in formal semantics, some under the header of ‘super semantics’, have aimed
at capturing iconicity and depiction within the possible worlds framework that has proven so
successful in linguistics (Schlenker, 2017, 2018).3 In this paper we continue the pioneering
work on the formal semantics of comics started by Dorit Abusch (2012, 2014). More specif-
ically, since attitude and speech reports have proven such a driving force behind linguistic se-
mantic theorizing ever since Frege (1892), we will here take a closer look at the ways attitudes
are represented in comics. Our study thus adopts linguistic semantic tools to capture certain
salient modes of attitude representation in pictures and comics, but in the end it turns out that
our investigation of pictorial viewpoint shifting also sheds new light on linguistic viewpoint
shifting phenomena.
2. Picture semantics
The centerpiece of a modern linguistic semantics formalization is a recursive definition of truth
for a language, relative to a possible world: JϕKw = 1 iff . . . . Once this recursive definition is
1We would like to thank the audiences of Sinn und Bedeutung 23 in Barcelona and the 2nd HSE Semantics and
Pragmatics Workshop in Moscow for valuable feedback. This research is supported by NWO Vidi Grant 276-80-
004 (The Language of Fiction and Imagination, PI: Emar Maier)
2See Giardino and Greenberg (2015), Greenberg (2013), Schlenker (2018) for more on iconicity and resemblance
in formal semantics.
3However, see also Zimmermann (2016) for a critical look at the idea that pictures, like sentences, express possible
worlds propositions.
in place, the content or proposition expressed by a sentence ϕ is then easily defined as the set
of worlds where ϕ is true. Pictures, especially photos, do not obviously have compositional
structure, but they are about something and we can capture that with the help of a definition of
truth in a world. A picture is true with respect to a possible world w iff there is a point v in w
from where w ‘looks like’ the picture.
Following Abusch (2015), Greenberg (2013) and many others we can make this semantics more
precise in terms of a projection function. A projection function pi is a recipe for collapsing a 3D
scene into a 2D plane. Formally, pi takes a world w and a viewpoint v, and returns a picture p:
pi(w,v) = p. There are many different kinds of projection functions: we have linear, curvilinear,
and parallel projections, projections that create black-and-white line figures with shading, and
projections that retain a full range of colors realistically. We can think of this variation in terms
of additional projection parameters, together defining a certain drawing style. In other words,
a picture may be true of a world (from a given viewpoint) under certain parameter settings but
false under certain other parameter settings. We will assume that the context determines the
right settings of these parameters and then ignore them in our notations below.
Summing up, we use the projection function pi (with contextually set parameters for perspective
type, edge-to-line-conversion type, colors, etc) to define when a given picture is true of a world,
from a given viewpoint:
(1)
uv }~v,w = 1 iff pi(w,v) =
From there we define propositional content (as the set of worlds in which the picture is true
from some viewpoint):
(2)
uv }~=
w ∃v
uv }~v,w = 1

3. From propositions to stories
3.1. The Dynamic Turn
Already in the 1980’s, semanticists started looking beyond classical propositions to model the
interpretation of utterances in the context of larger discourse. In dynamic semantics, the mean-
ing of a sentence is not primarily the proposition it expresses, but rather the way it affects the
context, i.e. the information conveyed by the discourse up to that point and further background
knowledge shared by the participants. One particularly successful dynamic framework is Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981). Below we illustrate the DRT framework
with a textbook example of dynamic interpretation in language (from Geurts 1999), before we
introduce an extension to DRT we call PicDRT that is able to model the dynamics of multi-
panel visual story-telling.
In DRT, information is representated in the form of a Discourse Representation Structure
(DRS). In (3b) we have represented the information conveyed by (3a), viz. that there exist
a policeman and a squirrel and the former chased the latter, in the standard box notation for
DRS’s.
(3) a. A policeman chased a squirrel.
b.
x y
policeman(x) squirrel(y)
chase(x,y)
To interpret the next utterance in the discourse, (4a), we first add its compositionally gener-
ated logical form to the current discourse representation, representing pronouns as discourse
referents that need to be resolved (=?).
(4) a. He caught it.
b.
x y z w
policeman(x) squirrel(y)
chase(x,y)
catch(z,w)
z=? w=?
We then proceed to resolve all the unknowns, by finding suitable antecedents among the ac-
cessible discourse referents. In this case, z (representing the pronoun he) binds to x (the po-
liceman), w to y. We may then simplify by unifying the equated discourse referents to get the
eventual output DRS in (5b).
(5) a.
x y z w
policeman(x) squirrel(y)
chase(x,y)
catch(z,w)
z= x w= y
b.
x y
policeman(x) squirrel(y)
chase(x,y)
catch(x,y)
In this way we end up with an updated DRS representing the information conveyed by the two-
sentence discourse. A next sentence could continue adding information about the policeman
and the squirrel, using pronouns or other definites to refer back to these old discourse refer-
ents (it bit him), or it could introduce new discourse referents, using indefinites (a woman was
standing nearby). This way of cashing out the fundamental distinction between definites (intro-
ducing discourse referents that want to be bound to previously established ones) and indefinites
(introducing new discourse referents) is one of the basic features of DRT. It is also here that
pictorial discourse differs somewhat from linguistic discourse.
3.2. Introducing PicDRT
We can tell Geurts’s simple mini-story also without words.
(6)
The juxtaposition of pictures in (6) is quite naturally interpreted as representing a temporal
progression of two closely related events, the first picture shows a policeman chasing a squirrel,
and the second shows him catching it. In this section we extend DRT with picture conditions
and discourse referents to model that interpretation of sequential images (or comics, McCloud
1993, Cohn 2013b).
3.2.1. The PicDRT language
We’ll extend the formal language of DRS’s with picture conditions, consisting of a picture
discourse referent (pi) and an actual picture.4 To capture the intuition that the policeman in the
second picture refers to the same policeman as in the first, we need to impose some structure
on pictures inside a PicDRS. We need to somehow identify discourse referents in the pictures
(Abusch, 2012). We’ll assume that the DRS construction algorithm manages to identify some
regions of interest in a picture, viz. those regions that correspond to salient entities (like the
policeman and the squirrel in (6)), and label those regions with fresh discourse referents. The
first picture of the story in (6) will be represented in PicDRT as:
(7)
p1 x1 y1
p1:
What this means is roughly that there is a situation or event5 in the world that (from some
viewpoint) looks like the picture, and in that situation there are two salient individuals, who
look like the two regions labeled in the picture. We return to the model-theoretic/semantic
details below, after we first illustrate the dynamics of the system.
3.2.2. PicDRT dynamics and pragmatics
The motivation for introducing discourse referents in pictures is to model the dynamics of
storytelling with picture sequences. In the linguistic version of the story, (3)–(4), the second
utterance could refer back to previously established discourse referents by using pronouns. As
Abusch notes, there are no obvious pictorial analogues of pronouns (or definites or presuppo-
sition triggers more generally). There is nothing in the second picture that specifies that the
depicted squirrel and policeman must be familiar from previous discourse rather than repre-
senting two new agents that just look similar. We’ll assume, with Abusch, that each picture
in a sequence introduces its own new discourse referents corresponding to salient regions, and
it is left to pragmatics to determine whether some are to be treated as coreferential. Updating
the representation in (7) with the second picture in (7) thus yields (8a). Pragmatic reasoning
4This makes a lot of sense if we think of DRS’s as mental representations, which are quite naturally thought of as
partly symbolic, partly iconic (visual/pictorial).
5We leave the tricky ontological details for another occasion (e.g. Should we use situation or event semantics?
Should we label the event(s) with event discourse referents in the picture? Can an event even be depicted?)
based on assumptions of coherent storytelling will allow the reader to conclude that the sec-
ond policeman is likely the same as the first, and similarly for the squirrel, which gives us the
pragmatically strengthened representation in (8b).
(8) a.
p1 x1 y1 p2 x2 y2
p1: p2:
b.
p1 x1 y1 p2 x2 y2
p1: p2:
x2 = x1 y2 = y1
The pragmatically enriched PicDRS output in (8b) means roughly the same as the DRS output
we derived for the linguistic story before: there’s a situation that looks like the first picture, with
two agents, looking like the two labeled regions, and there is another situation that looks like
the second picture, with these same two agents, now looking like like the two labeled regions
in the second picture. However, the ways in which we derived those outputs are importantly
different. In the linguistic case, the coreference was encoded in part by the linguistic structures
(pronouns) themselves, while in the pictorial case, it’s purely pragmatic, i.e. it’s ultimately
up to the interpreter to interpret the second policeman as the same as in the first picture, or
as a completely different new one. Similar points can be made about the temporal, aspectual,
causal, and coherence relations that connect the two discourse units. For instance, the fact
that the second sentence is interpreted as describing an event immediately following the first is
partly determined by the choice of tense and aspect morphology on the verbs. In the pictorial
version, there is no (obvious) analoguous morphology expressing temporal progression. In-
deed, as McCloud (1993) already notes, juxtaposition of pictures in a comic may occasionally
correspond to overlapping state descriptions, simultaneous shots from different viewpoints, or
flashbacks and jumps in time, so we’d do well do leave this temporal ordering, again, to prag-
matic strengthening. We will however assume that, by default, a picture to the right or below
(in Western comics and picture books) another corresponds to a state of affair that comes later.
We model this by adding a DRS condition of the form p1 < p2.
(9)
p1 x1 y1 p2 x2 y2
p1: p2:
x2 = x1 y2 = y1 p1 < p2
3.2.3. PicDRT semantics
In standard DRT we define when a DRS is true relative to a world w and a partial assignment
or embedding f mapping some discourse referents to individuals in the domain of the model
(as usual for any first-order language). For PicDRT we’ll need to add a third parameter v
providing viewpoints for the interpretation of the picture conditions (as described in section 2).
Since pictures in a comic tend to represent the world from a variety of viewpoints (in space
and time) we need our v to provide not one but a sequence of viewpoints, one for each picture
condition. Formally, let’s say v is a partial mapping from the set of pictorial discourse referents
({p1, p2, p3 . . .}) to points in space-time. Viewpoint functions then can be treated analogously
to standard DRT’s verifying embeddings, but for pictorial discourse referents.
Let’s illustrate with our (pragmatically strengthened) PicDRS output, (9), from above. The
starting point is that we use an assignment function f to verify the regular DRS conditions
(relative to w), and a viewpoint function v to verify the pictorial conditions (also relative to
w, using the projective definition of truth from section 2 above). Finally, since the regular,
descriptive discourse referents also correspond to picture regions we must make sure that f and
v are properly aligned (see (10c)).
(10)
uwwwwwwv
p1 x1 y1 p2 x2 y2
p1: p2:
x2 = x1 y2 = y1 p1 < p2
}~
w,v, f
=1 iff . . .
. . . iff there is a verifying embedding f ′ ⊃ f with Dom( f ′) = {x1,y1,x2,y2} and a
viewpoint function v′ ⊃ v with Dom(v′) = {p1, p2} such that:
a. f ′ verifies the descriptive conditions:
(i) f ′(x2) = f ′(x1)
(ii) f ′(y2) = f ′(y1)
b. v′ verifies the pictorial conditions:
(i) pi(w,v′(p1)) =
(ii) pi(w,v′(p2)) =
(iii) v′(p1)< v′(p2) (the viewpoint associated with p1 temporally precedes that
associated with p2)
c. f ′ and v′ are aligned:
(i) pi( f ′(x1),v′(p1)) = (the policeman-region in the picture is a projec-
tive (partial) depiction of the policeman represented by x1, from the view-
point associated with the picture)
(ii) pi( f ′(y1),v′(p1)) =
(iii) pi( f ′(x2),v′(p2)) =
(iv) pi( f ′(y2),v′(p2)) =
Note that the extension of DRT semantics sketched here allows us to deal with recursive em-
bedding of PicDRS’s in complex conditions with intensional operators, which we’ll encounter
below. It also allows us to define the usual semantic notions of content, like the classical propo-
sitional content of a PicDRS:
(11) JKK= {w JKKw, /0, /0 = 1}
4. Picturing speech and thought
In natural language semantics, from its Fregean beginnings in philosophy, attitude and speech
reports have always played an important role. As a case study for our PicDRT framework, let’s
see if we can adequately describe the various attitude reporting strategies in pictorial narra-
tives, starting with a few remarks about the obvious speech and thought bubbles, through free
perception sequences, and ending with what we call blended panels.
4.1. A note about bubbles
One of the most recognizable features of contemporary comics are speech and thought bubbles.
These devices are used to convey a character’s utterances or inner thoughts, as is illustrated in
(12) below. Usually, the utterances and thoughts are represented verbally, in written language.
Such bubbles can be straightforwardly analyzed as the visual language analogue of quotation
marks in language (Saraceni, 2003). Interestingly, comics also allow for the use of pictures
inside thought (and, more rarely, speech) bubbles to represent an agent’s thoughts or other
mental states iconically.6
(12) a. b.
We choose to leave a detailed analysis of speech and thought bubbles as a form of quotation (or
demonstration) for a future occasion. Instead we want to focus here on arguably more purely
pictorial modes of representing mental states. For an extensive analysis on speech and thought
bubbles in comics within a different kind of framework, see Cohn (2013a).
4.2. Free perception and viewpoint shift
Abusch and Rooth (2017) discuss the phenomenon of free perception sequences in wordless
comics as a way to represent what a character is seeing. Typically, we have a panel showing a
character looking, followed by a panel depicting what they see, as if through their eyes.7
6(12)a: The Amazing Spider-Man #1, 1963, Marvel Comics; (12)b: Logicomix: An epic search for truth, 2015,
Bloomsbury Publishing USA.
7(13)a: Hostage, 2017, Vintage Publishing. (13)b: Cyanide and Happiness, 2018, http://explosm.net/
comics/4913/.
(13) a. b.
Following Abusch and Rooth (2017) we can analyze this kind of perception representation
purely extensionally: the two pictures just describe the same (set of) world(s), but from two
different viewpoints. Basically, interpreting the sequence involves fixing the viewpoint for the
perception panels on to the location of the protagonist’s eyes (at the looking time).
We can model this in PicDRT by introducing a special predicate ‘view(x, p)’ to capture the
viewpoint shift. Note that the view-condition is, again, a pragmatic inference, drawn by the
careful reader familiar with film and comic conventions like the setup panels focusing on the
character’s eyes.
(14)
. . . p2 x2 p3 x3
. . . p2: p3:
. . . view(x2, p3)
As stated, the semantics of this view-condition is purely extensional:
(15) Jview(x2, p3)K f ,v,w = 1 iff v(p3) corresponds to the location of the eyes of f (x2) (and
the time of looking) in w
On this approach we’re not really dealing with the representation of perception as a mental
state.
The question arises whether there might be a linguistic analogue of this type of free perception
representation. Abusch and Rooth (2017) refer to work by Brinton (1980) and Hinterwim-
mer (2017), who discuss the phenomenon of ‘represented perception’ in narratives (see also
Banfield 1982 on ‘representing non-reflective consciousness’). Two examples are given below:
(16) a. He looked at his mother. Her blue eyes were watching the cathedral quietly. (D.H.
Lawrence Sons and Lovers, cited by Brinton 1980)
b. Sara got up and went to the window. A crowd had gathered outside the public
house. A man was being thrown out. There he came, staggering. (Virginia Woolf
The Years, cited by Banfield 1982)
In (16a) the second sentence is most naturally interpreted as a description of what the subject of
the first sentence was seeing. In (16b) the choice of the deictic came (rather than went) suggests
that indeed the scene is described from the perspective of the salient viewing character, Sara.
4.3. Non-veridical free perception
Apart from evidently extensional viewpoint shifting – i.e. veridical free perception, in Abusch
and Rooth (2017) terminology – there are also cases in which a narrative describes a fictional
character’s visions, dreams or hallucinations that are clearly not veridical. In (17) Rorschach is
shown an inkblot which triggers a visual memory of a dead dog.
(17) 8
Unlike in the sequences in (13) above, the dead dog is just in the protagonist’s mind and is not
part of the actual scene. In (18), Bart Simpson is shown looking at an empty jar, followed by a
representation of what he sees, a dead fairy in the jar.
(18) 9
As in the previous cases of free perception, the second panel seems to depict the situation
as viewed from Bart’s geometric viewpoint, but instead of depicting the story world itself, it
depicts the world according to Bart. Similarly, the last picture from the Watchmen sequence in
(17) shows what Rorschach brings to his memory while looking at the drawing. In this sense,
the picture is also a case of non-veridical perception as it does not represent the actual scene,
but represents a scene from a different time that the protagonist brings to his mind.
In order to capture non-veridicality in our framework, we need an intensional operator here.
Abusch and Rooth essentially posit such a hidden operator in the syntactic structure of the
second picture. By contrast, we adopt a pragmatic approach and derive the insertion of a
relevant operator on the basis of Eckardt’s (2014) notion of a Cautious Update. To introduce
this concept we take a little detour into the pragmatics of non-cooperative communication.
Linguists tend to assume idealized cooperative exchange situations in which the speaker in-
tends to provide reliable information and the hearer trusts the speaker. In this case, asserting
a proposition p means adding it to the common ground. This, Eckardt calls a Trust Update.
However, a hearer may well distrust or disagree with the speaker. In such cases, the hearer
may not accept the speaker’s assertion that p and refrain from adding p to the common ground.
8Watchmen, 1987, DC Comics.
9Bart Simpson’s Treehouse of Horror #12, 2006, Bongo Comics.
Instead, the hearer may accept something weaker, e.g. that the speaker believes that p. In
Eckardt’s terminology, we do a Cautious Update: instead of accepting and updating with p we
update with Belxp.10
We can now view our non-veridical sequences as requiring the reader to perform a kind of
Cautious Update, because a straightforward Trust Update will lead to an incoherent output
where an inkblot suddenly changes into a dead dog, or a jar is empty the one moment and then
contains a mythical creature the next. In PicDRT, we distinguish now two types of update. So
far we’ve modeled the PicDRT Trust Update, which will always be the default interpretation
strategy. Applied to the Simpsons comic, this standard update would lead to an incoherent
output, even if we infer an extensional viewpoint shift condition, as shown in (19):
(19)
p1 x1 y1 z1 p2 x2
p1: p2:
view(x1, p2)
On this reading, Bart holds an empty jar and as soon as he looks at it a dead fairy appears. This
is inconsistent with the rest of the story because it would predict that Lisa and others would
be able to see the creature whenever Bart looks at it, which is clearly not the case. Whenever
a Trust Update fails to get a coherent output we may resort to Cautious Update, which means
that we add a suitable attitude operator to the information from the second picture. For these
pictorial cases we’ll assume a perceptual attitude operator, PERCx, meaning something like ‘x
mentally perceives that . . . ’, (20b). We’ll further assume that the referent for the perceiving
agent x can be bound to any currently salient discourse referent.
(20) a.
p1 x1 y1 z1
p1: PERCx1
p2 x2
p2:
b. JPERCx1KK f ,v,w = 1 iff for all 〈w′,v′〉 compatible with x1’s de se ‘perceptual ex-
perience’ (i.e. v′(pi) is the viewpoint from where f (x1) experiences world w′ for
all pi in U(K)): JKK f ,v′,w′ = 1
Note that by using a monstrous operator PERCx, modeling de se perception, we account for
both the free perception’s visual viewpoint shift and the non-veridical, attitudinal embedding
at once.
We conclude this discussion of free perception by again pointing out that there are seemingly
10Eckardt goes on to use this mechanism also for the interpretation of free indirect discourse. See Altshuler and
Maier (2018) for another application of Cautious Update in DRT. See Asher and Lascarides (2013) for more on
non-cooperative conversation, and Kamp (2016) for another way to handle updates from unreliable conversion
partners in a mentalistic variant of DRT.
analogous phenomena in the linguistic domain. The following example, from The Shining,
describes a scene where the hotel manager gives Jack, Wendy and Danny a tour of the hotel
and Danny has a vision while they are admiring the presidential suite:11
(21) Jack and Wendy were so absorbed in the view that they didn’t look down at Danny,
who was staring not out the window but at the red-and-white-striped silk wallpaper to
the left, where a door opened into an interior bedroom. And his gasp, which had been
mingled with theirs, had nothing to do with beauty. Great splashes of dried blood,
flecked with tiny bits of grayish-white tissue, clotted the wallpaper. It made Danny
feel sick.
The splashes of dried blood are part of Danny’s psychic vision. It is clear from the rest of the
story that there really is no blood to be seen there. The narrator describes the scene as mentally
perceived by Danny. In our Eckardt-based approach, this means the reader is supposed to
perform Cautious Update, interpreting the final passage as embedded under a mental perception
operator like in (20b).
4.4. Perspective blending
We have dealt with sequences of pictures involving perspective shifting from one picture to
another. However, in comics (as well as in other media like film) it is very common to depict
a character and their subjective experience (faulty perception, imagination, dreams etc.) in a
single image (or scene, in the case of film). In (22a), from the same Simpsons story as the
above, Bart is depicted as holding the jar with the fairy inside, though it’s still evidently only
visible to him. In (22b) Batman’s sidekick Robin is hit by Scarecrow’s fear toxin and has to
confront his own worst nightmares, which are depicted from various angles, but none of them
from the perspective of Robin himself (as he himself is visible on almost every panel). In (22c)
we first see Calvin with his friend Susie; followed by a depiction of that same scene in the way
Calvin himself imagines it.12 13
11Stephen King, The Shining, 1977.
12Zimmermann (2016) points out a similar case of blended, non-veridical perception in Ferdinand Bol’s 1642
painting Jacob’s dream. Another example is Antonio de Pereda’s 1650 The Knight’s Dream which depicts a
sleeping knight next to the contents of his dream, an angel and various symbols of vanity.
13(22)b: Batman and Robin Eternal #2, 2015, DC Comics; (22)c: Calvin and Hobbes, Andrews McMeel Publish-
ing.
(22) a.
b. c.
Because such images depict the perceiving, dreaming or hallucinating character (from an appar-
ently neutral viewpoint), alongside the contents of their subjective experience, it seems that two
perspectives are ‘blended’ in a single image. Such mixing of perspectives is reminiscent of the
phenomenon of free indirect discourse in linguistic narrative, which is likewise characterized
as blending two simultaneous perspectives or voices. Consider the example in (23).
(23) She looked at the calendar. But. . . then the deadline was tomorrow! How was she
supposed to fix that bloody paper in one day?
The second sentence in (23) describes what the protagonist is thinking, while looking at the
calendar. On the one hand it thus represents the world from the protagonist’s perspective,
faithfully capturing her mood by means of exclamation, hesitation, and question marking, and
by the use of indexicals like tomorrow reflecting the protagonist’s perspective. On the other
hand, the third person pronouns and past tenses reflect the neutral narrator’s perspective.14
There are two main types of semantic approaches to free indirect discourse. The quotational ap-
proach treats it as a form of quotation, where pronouns and tenses are systematically unquoted
(Maier, 2015, 2017). Bicontextual approaches introduce a second, shifted context parameter
(‘context of thought’ or ‘protagonist context’) that takes care of the shifted interpretations of in-
dexicals like tomorrow in (23) (Schlenker, 2004; Eckardt, 2014). Either way, the effect is that
part of a free indirect discourse passage will be semantically interpreted relative to the neu-
tral, narrator’s perspective/context, while other parts get interpreted relative to the protagonist’s
perspective/context. So let’s see if we can translate that insight to our pictorial blends.
Take another example, (24a), where we see the protagonist, Joe, and his hallucinations – his
toys having come to life and surrounding him. Following the free indirect discourse approach,
part of the picture should represent the actual state of affairs in the story, the part depicting Joe
lying on the floor, while the rest of the picture represents Joe’s subjective experience. Sticking
14For a short overview of different narratological theories about Free Indirect Discourse, see Bray (2007).
with a free indirect discourse approach thus entails that in interpreting (24a) we essentially split
the picture in two parts, separating the experiencer, depicted from the neutral perspective, from
the subjective experience itself, as in (24b).15
(24) a. b.
In this way, interpreting the original blended picture is reduced to splitting the perspectives (just
like we separate the quotation/protagonist-oriented and unquotation/narrator-oriented parts of
a free indirect discourse in our familiar semantic approaches to the linguistic phenomenon) and
then interpreting the result essentially as a non-veridical free perception sequence.
On closer inspection this linguistically inspired approach gives the wrong result. Unlike in a
free perception sequence, the viewpoint remains stable in (24b). The subjective experience
part, where Joe is cut out, presents Joe’s mental state, but not from his perspective. The Calvin
and Hobbes passage in (22)c makes this even clearer. The blended panel presents the scene
from the exact same neutral viewpoint as the previous panel. In addition, note that it would be
impossible to split that picture into an experiencer, Calvin, and his experience, as his experience
affects the way Calvin himself is depicted (as an astronaut).
In sum, a blended picture presents a scene from a single viewpoint, the narrator’s, not the
protagonist’s, and is thus not strictly speaking a case of ‘dual voice’ after all. Instead, we can
think of the blended panels as the analogues of (nonmonstrous) indirect discourse and attitude
reports in English.
(25) Joe dreamed that he was surrounded by his toys
An indirect report like (25) shows no shifted indexicals that might indicate quotation or some
other shift to a protagonist context. Everything in (25) is interpreted from the narrator’s neutral
perspective, all we have here is an intensional operator quantifying over Joe’s dream worlds.
In PicDRT we propose that Cautious Update may introduce, instead of a monstrous, de se
perception operator (PERCx from (20b)), also a non-monstrous, purely intensional attitude
operator (ATTx). For the blended Simpsons panel in (22)a this results in the output in (26):
15(24)a: Joe the Barbarian, 2011, Vertigo Comics.
(26) a.
p1 x1 y1
p1: ATTx1
p2 x2 y2 z2
p2:
x2 = x1 y2 = y1
b. JATTx1KK f ,v,w = 1 iff for all w′ compatible with f (x1)’s attitudinal state in w:JKK f ,v,w′ = 1
5. Conclusion
Pictures, like sentences, have truth-conditional content. And sequences of pictures, like se-
quences of sentences, can be used to tell stories. We introduce PicDRT, a simple extension of
standard DRT to analyze pictorial storytelling in a dynamic semantic setting.
The current paper presents a PicDRT case study on attitude and perception reporting in picto-
rial narratives. First, we briefly suggest that the familiar speech and thought bubbles in modern
comics may be thought of as the pictorial analogue of quotation, but we leave a detailed study
for future research. We then spend some time reconstructing and adapting ideas from Abusch
and Rooth (2017) on free perception sequences in PicDRT. Though closely related, our analysis
is more pragmatic in nature than theirs. For non-veridical free perception cases, for instance,
we invoke a pragmatic mechanism based on Eckardt’s (2014) Cautious Update, introducing
a pragmatically inferred de se perceptual experience operator. We go on to consider a phe-
nomenon we call blended panels, where a protagonist’s mental state may be depicted alongside
the experiencing protagonist herself in a single panel. We compared this phenomenon to free
indirect discourse in linguistic narrative but concluded that the analogy fails. A blended pic-
ture is more like a regular indirect attitude report, i.e. involving an intensional operator but no
perspective shift or quotation.
In conclusion, applying the formal semantic toolkit of DRT, and importing insights from the
semantic analysis of linguistic attitude reporting and quotation, has helped us better understand
certain types of attitude representation in the visual domain. At the same time, the discussion
of free perception panels in particular has led us to consider the way we represent perception in
linguistic narratives, an area that is quite underdeveloped in formal semantics (Hinterwimmer
2017 being a notable exception).
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